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Abstract  
In dominant party states in sub-Saharan Africa where presidential succession occurs 
regularly, factional competition culminates in the selection of presidential candidates, a 
process which is frequently more competitive than a general election. It is crucial that 
dominant parties manage factionalism in presidential candidate selection, maintain party 
coherence and win elections. Against such a background, this study examines how 
dominant parties in five African countries with regular presidential succession, namely, 
Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa, have managed 
factionalism and avoided critical defections. The study finds that presidential candidate 
selection in all cases except that of South Africa since 2007 have been centralised, albeit 
to varying degrees, to control factionalism. The study demonstrates a wide variation in 
methods and practices of presidential candidate selection, including the level of 
selectorate inclusiveness, which can be explained partially by differences in electoral 
institutions. The study also finds a common measure taken in three case countries to 
accommodate rival factions in the interest of reconsolidating party unity after the 
defection of senior party members. The study aims to help our understanding of 
succession management as a crucial internal factor in the endurance of one-party 
dominance in some countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In December 2017, Cyril Ramaphosa was elected president of South Africa’s African 
National Congress (ANC) after defeating Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma by a narrow margin 
of 179 votes out of 4,708 at the party’s national conference. Subsequently, her ex-husband 
President Jacob Zuma resigned under ANC pressure mainly due to corruption allegations, 
and Ramaphosa was sworn in as President in February 2018. He will be the ANC 
presidential candidate for the legislative election scheduled for May 2019 (Schneidman 
2017; The Guardian 14 February 2018; Reuters 7 November 2018). Just two months later, 
in the neighbouring country of Botswana, Vice President Mokgweetsi Masisi succeeded 
President Ian Khama and assumed the presidency. Khama had appointed Masisi his 
deputy in 2014 and voluntarily retired from office a year before the end of his two five-
year terms in 2018, which led to Vice President Masisi’s automatic presidential 
succession. The early retirement of the president has become the custom of the ruling 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) to avoid excessive factional infighting and ensure the 
party’s continued electoral success (Republic of Botswana 13 November 2014; 
Beardsworth 16 April 2018). While both the ANC and BDP are dominant parties in 
democracies with regular multiparty elections and presidential succession, they have 
contrasting methods of presidential candidate selection: while ANC presidential 
candidates are selected by thousands of party delegates in a decentralised and competitive 
manner, BDP candidates are chosen solely by incumbent presidents. 
In dominant party states where presidential succession occurs regularly, factional 
competition culminates in presidential candidate selection, a process which is frequently 
more competitive than a general election. It is thus crucial that dominant parties manage 
factionalism in selecting their presidential candidates, maintain party coherence and win 
elections. With the stark difference in selection methods between Botswana and South 
Africa in mind, this study examines how African dominant parties have managed 
factionalism and avoided serious defections in the presidential candidate selection process. 
Altogether, the study analyses five dominant party states with regular presidential 
succession, namely, Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa. The 
presidents of these countries invariably respect term limits and step down from office on 
or before term completion. Therefore, they differ from other dominant party states such 
as Uganda and Rwanda where presidential terms have been much more open-ended 
(Reyntjens 2016: 61). 
The study found that the presidential candidate selection of all parties except the 
ANC since 2007 is generally centralised to control factionalism. The study also suggests 
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that the variation in the level of selectorate inclusiveness can be explained partially by 
differences in electoral systems. In South Africa where presidential candidates are elected 
at the National Assembly after legislative elections under a closed-list Proportional 
Representation system, citizens do not vote for candidates but for parties in an election. 
Under this system, ANC’s decentralised presidential candidate selection demonstrates 
intraparty democracy to maintain wide electoral support by providing an opportunity for 
party members to express their views through local party delegates. The study also found 
that a common presidential strategy in three countries is to accommodate rival factions to 
reconsolidate party unity after the defections of senior party members. The study aims to 
deepen our understanding of the mechanisms of succession management as a crucial 
internal factor for the endurance of one-party dominance in African countries. 
This study takes an inductive approach, applying process tracing in combination 
with case comparisons (Mason 2002: 179–181; Bennett and Checkel 2015: 7–8)1 to 
identify causal mechanisms that may explain the maintenance of party unity in the 
presidential candidate selection process. It draws mainly on secondary sources except in 
the case of Tanzania, which is underpinned by the author’s in-country interviews with key 
informants between September and November 2015 (Tsubura 2018).  
The paper is divided into four sections. The first reviews the literature on 
dominant parties in sub-Saharan Africa, factionalism and party leadership selection, and 
demonstrates the importance of presidential candidate selection in understanding the 
internal mechanisms of the endurance of dominant parties. The second section examines 
the selection methods and practices of the five case parties with a focus on the interaction 
with factional dynamics. The third section analyses the variation and a common tendency 
among the five cases. Finally, the paper concludes with a few suggestions on the way 
forward for future research. 
 
2. Dominant Parties, Factionalism and Leadership Selection 
 
This study builds on three interrelated themes in the literature: 1) dominant parties; 2) 
factionalism in political parties; and 3) leadership selection in political parties. Firstly, 
there is a growing number of studies on the characteristics of political parties and party 
systems in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Van de Walle and Butler 1999; Salih 2003; 
Cheeseman 2010: 53–57; LeBas 2011; Riedl 2014; Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2014), and 
studies focusing on dominant party systems in the region (e.g., Ishiyama and Quinn 2006; 
                                                   
1 See Bennett and Checkel (2015: 19, 29) for the advantages of combing process tracing and case 
comparisons, rather than rigidly applying Mill’s methods of comparison. 
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Lindberg and Jones 2010; Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2013). Once largely characterised by 
the prevalence of one-party dominance in the 1990s, African countries are now following 
divergent paths (Van de Walle 2002; Bogaards 2004; Cheeseman 2010). While some have 
experienced repeated electoral turnovers, others have thus far remained dominant party 
states (For the identification of African dominant parties, see De Jager and Du Toit 2012: 
7-12; Bogaards 2014; Erdmann and Basedaw 2013; Bogaards 2004). Thus, the question 
as to why some dominant party systems endure while others have been replaced is 
increasingly important in understanding the state of African democracy. 
The second and central theme of the literature on which this study builds is 
factionalism. One of the internal factors for the endurance of dominant parties in Africa 
has been identified as elite coordination or management of factionalism (Doorenspleet 
and Nijzink 2013: 198, 202; Doorenspleet and Nijzink 2014: 173; see also Boucek 2012: 
34–35 for factionalism of dominant parties in general). Factionalism can be defined as 
‘the partitioning of a political party into sub-groups [that are] more or less institutionalised 
and engage in collective action to achieve their members’ particular objectives’ (Boucek 
2012: 37). Factionalism is important in the studies of dominant party states because intra-
party competition in such countries tends to be more intense and influential in determining 
national leadership, thereby shaping political power relations, than inter-party 
competition in a general election. Indeed, the failure of dominant parties to manage 
infighting resulting in the defection of powerful leaders is one of the reasons for the end 
of dominant party rule in African countries such as Senegal in 2000, Zambia in 2001, 
Kenya in 2002, Sierra Leone in 2007, and Nigeria in 2015 (Cooper 2015: 3; Owen and 
Usman 2015; Hartmann 2013: 172–174; Simutanyi 2013: 121; Cheeseman 2010: 143–
144). It is therefore worth examining how African dominant parties have dealt with 
factional competition in selecting new leaders and sustained long-term rule. 
Among the various causal mechanisms for the endurance and demise of 
dominant parties cited by political scientists, Garrido de Sierra’s (2014) Clientele 
Migration Theory, which is based on his analysis of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI), provides a useful analytical lens to this study. Drawing on studies of 
dominant party regimes by Van de Walle (1994), Geddes (1999), Greene (2008) and 
Magaloni (2006), Garrido de Sierra (2014: 47) argues that ‘the survival of a dominant-
party regime largely depends on the unity of its factions’. He goes on to posit that factions 
are likely to remain in a dominant party as long as it provides each of the factional leaders 
‘an expected utility that is relatively higher than what any other party can offer them’ 
(Garrido de Sierra 2014: 47, emphasis in original). He also stresses that dominant party 
regimes are seriously threatened only ‘when many mid- and high-ranked leaders decide 
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to leave the party along with their clienteles and resources’ (Garrido de Sierra 2014: 47). 
This type of defection can be considered an example of what Boucek (2012: 34) terms 
‘critical defections [which expand the electoral field for the opposition and become] the 
main drivers of regime change following long periods of one-party dominance’. 
Conversely, it can be stated that a dominant party with regular leadership succession 
represents successful avoidance of such critical defections even if it faces intense 
intraparty competition in selecting a new leader. 
The present study broadly applies Clientele Migration Theory as a basic premise 
in examining how its five case parties have avoided critical defections, with two 
additional considerations. Firstly, while dominant parties are viewed as actors that decide 
and allocate ‘an expected utility’ (Garrido de Sierra 2014: 47) to factional leaders, this 
study seeks to identify which actors in particular have the power to do so. Secondly, 
among the various utilities, this study focuses on patronage, particularly the appointment 
of cabinet and party posts, with the assumption that such positions strengthen the power 
of factional leaders over the allocation of resources and enable them to expand their 
factions. The study also pays attention to the extent to which factional leaders have 
presidential aspirations, which influences the likelihood of their defection together with 
their loyalists following failure to secure presidential candidacy. 
The final theme on which this study builds is leadership selection in political 
parties. Academic attention to party leadership, including leadership selection, in the 
study of contemporary Western democracies is a relatively new and limited field in 
comparison to party organisation, membership and candidate selection (Pilet and Cross 
2015: 4–7). Yet, it is vital given the scale of the power entrusted to party leaders in 
national politics, and, moreover, the ‘particular method that a party uses to select its leader 
is likely to affect the types of persons that emerge, and the abilities they bring with them’ 
(Punnett 1992: 2). One of the central attributes of leadership selection increasingly 
discussed is the ‘selectorate’ or ‘the body that selects the party leader’ (Kenig 2009: 434). 
Democratisation of leadership selection ‘almost always refers to the process of opening 
up the selectorate to a wider range of voters’ (Kenig 2009: 434), while there is a trend in 
Europe and Canada for leadership selection methods to become more inclusive and 
democratic (Pilet and Cross 2015: 5). As illustrated by the cases of Botswana and South 
Africa in the introduction to the present paper, the most notable difference between them 
and the other three cases is the level of selectorate inclusiveness and this aspect is 
therefore examined carefully in this paper. 
While most of the literature on leadership selection in African political parties 
addresses single case studies, Cooper’s (2013: 267–318; 2015) comparative analyses of 
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dominant parties in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa are insightful. Focusing on party 
cohesion as one aspect of electoral competition, he finds that in dominant parties, defeated 
leadership candidates and their loyalists are likely to remain in the party if the president 
mediates between rival factions to create opportunities for the former to advance their 
careers within the party (Cooper 2013: 300–301). However, while Cooper (2013: 267–
318; 2015) regards any defection of a party leader as indicative of party fragmentation 
and explores how and why this occurs at different points in time, the present paper does 
not treat the defection which has a limited impact on electoral competition as serious party 
fragmentation. Rather, it examines how African dominant parties have avoided the type 
of defection that would be expected to seriously threaten their long-term rule by 
highlighting the management of factionalism. Indeed, the paper demonstrates that a major 
but not critical defection may function as a cautionary lesson to the president of a 
dominant party state, prompting him or her to prioritise party cohesion by accommodating 
rival factions within the party after such a defection. 
 
3. Five African Dominant Parties with Regular Presidential Succession 
 
An important democratic rule increasingly institutionalised in Africa since 1990 is the 
setting of presidential term limits (Bogaards 2014: 38; Cheeseman 2015: 176–182; 
Reyntjens 2016; Posner and Young 2018). The present paper compares presidential 
candidate selection in dominant parties in which presidents adhere to term limits and there 
have been multiple leadership successions during the multiparty period. Takeuchi (2016: 
43) identifies such states as Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, Tanzania and South Africa, 
all of which are located in eastern and southern Africa. 2 Dominant parties in these 
countries commonly originated in liberation movements before independence from 
colonial rule, or in opposition to apartheid in the case of South Africa (Takeuchi 2016: 
43). 
Interestingly, the parties discussed in the present paper are often distinguished 
from authoritarian dominant parties according to criteria other than presidential term limit. 
Lindberg and Jones (2010), for example, classify them as ‘democratic dominant parties’ 
by analysing the relationship between party system, government effectiveness, economic 
                                                   
2 Seychelles is another African dominant party state with regular presidential succession, the 
presidential term limit being three five-year terms between 1993 and 2016 and changed to two five-
year terms in 2016 (Takeuchi 2016: 43; Reyntjens 2016: Supplement 2; Seychelles New Agency 5 
April 2016). Yet, Seychelles is excluded from the present study because presidential succession has 
taken place only once and changes in the process over time therefore cannot be examined (Posner 
and Young 2018: 266).  
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development and corruption. Additionally, Bogaards (2008) finds that dominant parties 
in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa have greater electoral stability than 
such parties in authoritarian regimes.3 
Apart from the aforementioned commonalities, there are some basic differences 
across the five case parties, three of which are as follows. Firstly, in terms of length of 
multiparty democracy, while Botswana is one of only two African countries that have 
operated a multiparty system since independence and has held 11 such elections to date, 
Tanzania transferred from a one-party state to multiparty system in 1992 and has held 
only five multiparty elections. Yet, if presidential term limit is taken into account, 
Botswana, which introduced it in 1997, has held only four elections to date. Indeed, the 
number of multiparty elections held with presidential term limits are similar among the 
cases between three (in Mozambique) and five (in Namibia, South Africa and Tanzania) 
(Reyntjens 2016; African Election Database n.d.; International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems n.d.). 
The second important difference among the five cases concerns their respective 
electoral systems. While one-party dominance has emerged in all electoral systems in 
Africa (Erdmann and Basedau 2008), presidents are chosen by direct election using the 
first-past-the-post (FPTP) system in Namibia, Mozambique and Tanzania, whereas 
Botswanan and South African presidents are elected by a national assembly after a 
legislative election in Botswana and South Africa. Furthermore, legislative election 
systems differ between Botswana and South Africa: while the elections in the former are 
held under the FPTP system, the latter uses the closed-list proportional representation 
(PR) system (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2008). The relationship between the electoral 
systems and their respective methods and practices of presidential candidate selection are 
examined in the analysis section of this paper. 
The third important difference is broader than and affects the first two differences, 
and concerns historical and socioeconomic background. For example, the case countries 
were colonised by different European countries or South Africa in the case of Namibia. 
As discussed by De Jager and Du Toit (2012: 5–7), different colonial and other historical 
experiences have led to diverse path-dependent trajectories in terms of political 
development in the case countries, and variations in socioeconomic conditions should 
also be taken into account. For example, as of 2017, populations ranged from 2.3 million 
in Botswana to 57.3 million in Tanzania. The level of economic development also differs 
widely, 2016 gross domestic product (GDP) per capita varying between US$379 in 
                                                   
3 Bogaards (2008) does not include Tanzania because it had not experienced three consecutive 
multiparty elections at the time of his study. 
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Mozambique and US$6,917 in Botswana (United Nations n.d.). Taking an inductive 
approach, the present paper seeks to explain whether and to what extent certain historical 
events and socioeconomic conditions have contributed to variations in the management 
of factionalism in presidential candidate selection rather than using them as criteria for 
elimination of cases from the study. 
The case studies below are ordered by the level of selectorate inclusiveness of 
the presidential candidate selection starting with the most centralised. Each of the case 
studies begins with a brief explanation of the historical background of the dominant party 
and its method of presidential candidate selection. It then examines selection practices 
with a focus on interaction with factional dynamics. 
 
3.1. Botswana: Automatic Presidential Succession to Control Factionalism 
 
Botswana’s dominant ruling party, the Botswana Development Party (BDP), is 
characterised by prolonged competition between two factions, which has resulted in the 
centralisation of presidential power over the selection of successors. Yet, a closer look at 
the BDP’s succession politics reveals that Botswanan presidents do not have full control 
of factionalism. Rather, the three presidents in office between 1980 and 2018 
compromised and accommodated the BDP’s rival factions in one way or another in the 
allocation of cabinet and other government positions to avoid critical defections. Thus, 
Botswanan presidents seem to be vested with power over leadership succession with the 
condition that they respect the BDP’s ‘culture of mutual accommodation’ (Maundeni and 
Lotshwao 2012: 63). 
Unlike most African countries, Botswana adopted a multiparty system at 
independence in 1966 (Lotshwao 2011: 103). Currently, 57 Members of Parliament are 
elected under the FPTP system, and the presidential candidate of the party winning the 
majority of parliamentary seats automatically becomes president of the country (Molomo 
2000: 106). Botswana’s first presidential succession was held without difficulty, President 
Khama dying in office in July 1980 and being succeeded by Vice President Ketumile 
Masire, who smoothly acceded to the presidency in accordance with the Constitution 
maintaining ‘more or less the same team that he inherited’ (Maundeni and Lotshwao 
2012: 60). The BDP won the following legislative elections of 1984, 1989 and 1994, 
albeit with steadily declining support (68%, 65% and 53% respectively), and Masire was 
re-elected by the National Assembly each time (African Election Database n.d.).  
However, under President Masire’s rule in the 1990s, the BDP was seriously 
affected by factional infighting. The division emerged in 1991 when BDP Secretary 
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General Daniel Kwelagobe and Vice President and BDP Chairman Peter Mmusi were 
accused of land grabbing in a presidential inquiry led by Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Mompati Merafhe. As a result, Kwelagobe and Mmusi were suspended from their party 
positions and resigned from the Cabinet (Weekend Post 12 January 2015). Since then, the 
BDP has been split between two factions. One was led by Kwelagobe and BDP Chairman 
Ponatshego Kedikilwe (after Mmusi died in 1994), and ‘largely represented the interests 
of older elites’ (Good and Taylor 2006: 55). The other was headed by Merafhe and 
attracted ‘newcomers who tried to reform and modernize the party’ (Makgala 2006: 169 
cited in Cooper 2013: 297). Merafhe’s group was later supported by President Masire’s 
successors Festus Mogae and Ian Khama. The two factions were considered to represent 
north-south divisions in the country and fought for leadership succession, significantly 
affecting party administration in the process (Molomo 2000: 96; Lotshwao 2011). In 
response to BDP internal strife, President Masire appointed Minister of Finance and 
Development Planning Festus Mogae as his new deputy in 1992, bypassing potential 
candidates of both factions (Sounders 2004: 91; Weekend Post 12 January 2015).  
Major amendments were made to the Constitution through a national referendum 
in 1997. Along with the introduction of a clause restricting presidential incumbency to 
two five-year terms, it was decided that the vice president, who was appointed by the 
president, would automatically succeed the incumbent in the case of his death or 
resignation to ensure a smooth succession (Republic of Botswana 2006; Morton, Ramsay 
and Mgadla 2008: xxix; Maundeni and Seabo 2015: 30).4 The BDP Constitution was 
also amended so that a special congress would be convened for selecting its presidential 
candidates during election years. However, in practice, presidents have been succeeded 
by vice presidents without such a congress (Maundeni and Seabo 2015: 30; Weekend Post 
3 September 2018). 
In addition to these amendments, President Masire sought to maintain balance 
between the two BDP factions. In 1997, he brokered a deal for the election of members 
of the Central Committee by asking delegates in Congress to endorse a list of candidates 
secretly nominated by each faction rather than voting for them (Molomo 2000: 96; 
Maundeni and Lotshwao 2012: 60). Masire also allocated the Merafhe faction executive 
government positions and the Kwelagobe/Kedikilwe faction other positions in the party 
(Good and Taylor 2006; Maundeni and Seabo 2015). 
 President Masire retired from office in 1998, one year before the end of his two 
five-year terms, and Vice President Mogae ascended to the presidency automatically. 
                                                   
4 See Otlhogile (1998: 215–216) on the selection of a successor in case of the president’s death or 
resignation, and the tenure of the presidency in Botswana before 1997. 
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Masire reportedly chose to retire early despite Kwelagobe and Merafhe’s opposition due 
to suspicion that Mogae would not have beaten either of them if a presidential candidate 
election had taken place openly within the party (Weekend Post 12 January 2015). In the 
election of 1999, the BDP increased its number of parliamentary seats from 27 (68%) to 
33 (83%) of 40 seats, mainly due to the fragmentation of opposition parties, and Mogae 
was elected president in Parliament (Lodge, Kadima and Pottie 2002: 47–48; African 
Elections Database n.d.). Thus, while constitutional amendments and balanced 
distribution of patronage mitigated intense factionalism within the party, President Masire 
established a custom that incumbent presidents should control leadership succession 
within the BDP. 
Unlike Masire, President Mogae did not accommodate the rivals and excluded 
leading members of the Kwelagobe/Kedikilwe faction in appointing cabinet ministers of 
his choice, which made further compromise between the two groups difficult to reach 
(Maundeni and Lotshwao 2012: 61). Mogae avoided the leaders of the two factions and 
appointed Lieutenant-General Ian Khama, eldest son of the first president Seretse Kham, 
vice president (Molomo 2000: 101). As with his predecessor, President Mogae resigned 
from office in 2008, a year before the end of his two five-year terms, and Vice President 
Khama automatically succeeded him. In the election of 2009, the BDP secured 45 (79%) 
of 57 parliamentary seats and President Khama subsequently took office (African 
Election Database n.d.). Khama’s presidency was reportedly authoritarian and highly 
personalised relying on trusted loyalists (Good 2009; Lotshwao 2011: 106–108). Initially, 
he favoured the Merafhe faction over the Kwelagobe/Kedikilwe faction and appointed 
Merafhe as vice president. When Kwelagobe/Kedikilwe loyalists won all the BDP Central 
Committee seats in 2009, Khama nominated additional members from the Merafhe 
faction and appointed 77 Merafhe loyalists to various subcommittees of the party, which 
infuriated the Kwelagobe/Kedikilwe faction (Good 2009: 323; Lotshwao 2011: 107; 
Maundeni and Lotshwao 2012: 61–62; Maundeni and Seabo 2015: 29–30).  
In 2010, the BDP experienced its first major defection, some members of the 
Kwelagobe/Kedikilwe faction who could not tolerate Khama’s leadership style leaving 
the BDP to form a new party, the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD), which 
immediately became the main Opposition. Due to this split, President Khama reached a 
compromise with Kwelagobe/Kedikilwe loyalists who had remained in the BDP 
(Maundeni and Lotshwao 2012: 62). Thus, after Vice President Merafhe retired from 
office due to ill health in 2012, Khama appointed Kedikilwe, who had been acting in the 
absence of Merafhe, as his new deputy until 2014 when Kedikilwe announced his 
retirement from active politics (Sunday Standard 9 October 2011; Weekend Post 12 
13 
 
January 2015; Botswana Guardian 17 December 2013; Cooper-Knock 2012).  
In the election in 2014, the BDP won 37 (65%) of 57 parliamentary seats and 
Khama was re-elected for a second term. The Umbrella for Democratic Change, an 
alliance formed by three opposition parties including the BMD, gained 17 (30%) seats 
(International Foundation for Electoral Systems n.d.). Khama appointed Minister of 
Education and Skills Development Mokgweetsi Masisi as vice president despite 
reservations about his capacity for leadership by some senior party members (Republic 
of Botswana 13 November 2014; Sunday Standard 14 May 2018). From a privileged 
background, his father having been a cabinet minister in Seretse Khama’s administration, 
Masisi rose rapidly through BDP ranks: he became an MP in 2009, a cabinet minister in 
2011, and has been BDP vice president since 2014 (Mail and Guardian 3 April 2018). 
Meanwhile, Kedikilwe retired from active politics as he had announced earlier, and 
Merafhe died in January 2015 (Botswana Daily News 7 January 2015). 
Like his predecessors, Khama resigned from office in 2018, a year before the 
end of his two terms, which made Masisi the next president automatically (This is Africa 
4 April 2018). Since then, a further division has emerged within the BDP between Masisi 
and Khama loyalists, and it is reported that Khama has become increasingly dissatisfied 
with Masisi’s disrespect for him (Weekend Post 18 June 2018; Botswana Guardian 15 
August 2018). While it is critical that the BDP solve this discord in preparation for the 
forthcoming election scheduled for October 2019, its dominant rule seems to be solid as 
the opposition remains fragmented (For the evolution of the opposition coalition in 
Botswana, see Poteete 2012: 84; Reuters 4 February 2017; Botswana Guardian 5 
November 2018; Botswana Guardian 12 November 2018). 
 In summary, Botswana’s BDP presidential candidate selection has been 
controlled by incumbent presidents for two decades in order to avoid excessive 
competition between its two factions and critical defections. As a result, even the first 
major split from the BDP and creation of the BMD in 2010 did not amount to a serious 
threat as the factional leader decided to remain in the BDP. The custom of automatic vice 
presidential succession has accommodated opposing factions through presidential 
appointments. As major factional leaders are either no longer alive or active in politics, 
division has recently focused on that between the incumbent and former presidents. Yet, 
given continued opposition fragmentation, the BDP is likely to retain its dominant power 
as long as it succeeds in controlling potential serious defections. 
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3.2. Namibia: the Incumbent’s Power over Presidential Candidate Selection 
 
Presidential candidate selection in Namibia’s dominant party, the South West Africa 
People’s Organisation (SWAPO), was initially characterised by the overwhelming power 
of the founding president, Sam Nujoma, and marginalisation of his opponents. His 
successor, Hifikepunye Pohamba, was imposed internally by Nujoma. While Nujoma’s 
power waned over time, President Pohamba campaigned for the election of Hage Geingob 
in secret.  
SWAPO was established in 1960 as a liberation movement in opposition to South 
African rule, and Namibia achieved independence in 1990 with the support of the 
international community. SWAPO gained dominance in the country when the United 
Nations General Assembly recognised it as the only legitimate representative of 
Namibians in 1976 (Melber 2006: 99, 113). Namibia has held regular multiparty elections 
since independence and presidents are elected directly by citizens using the FPTP system 
(Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2008). SWAPO has three national organs: the Political Bureau 
(21 members), Central Committee (70 members) and Congress (over 700 delegates). The 
Central Committee elects members of the Political Bureau and the party president. Until 
2007, SWAPO presidential candidate selection was an independent process whereby the 
Central Committee nominated three candidates and the winner was elected by an 
Extraordinary Congress. Since 2007, the party’s vice president has automatically become 
a presidential candidate (South West Africa People’s Organisation: 5–8; Cooper 2015: 11; 
New Era 4 December 2018). 
Nujoma was elected as the first Namibian president by the Constituent Assembly 
before independence in 1990 (Melber 2015: 50). As the Constitution had been amended 
to introduce a presidential term limit of two five years in 1989, before official 
independence, he served a three-term presidency on the grounds that he was not directly 
elected by citizens in 1990 (Melber 2006: 98; Melber 2015: 52). In August 2002, Nujoma 
chose Minister of Land and co-founder of SWAPO Hifikepunye Pohamba as his successor. 
Despite Pohamba’s reluctance to accept the role, he was imposed on the party as the only 
candidate for the party’s vice presidency (The Namibian 6 August 2002; Africa Research 
Bulletin 2004: 15639; Melber 2015: 56). 
In April 2004, SWAPO Central Committee nominated three presidential 
candidates for the general election in November (New Era 5 April 2004) and in May, an 
Extraordinary Congress was held to select the winner. Nujoma campaigned for Pohamba, 
dismissing main rival Foreign Minister Hidipo Hamutenya from the Cabinet four days 
before the Congress for allegedly inciting party disunity (Africa Research Bulletin 2004: 
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15752, 15836). There were two rounds of ballots in Congress. Pohamba and Hamutenya 
received 213 (41%) and 166 (32%) respectively of a total of 516 votes in the first round. 
In the second round, Pohamba won and was duly elected the party’s presidential candidate 
(Africa Research Bulletin 2004: 15752, 15986-8). In November 2004, Pohamba won the 
presidential election with a 76% majority (International Foundation for Electoral Systems 
n.d.). Nujoma remained the president of SWAPO and continued to exert power in the 
party until 2007 (Melber 2015: 56). 
With the strong backing of Nujoma, President Pohamba marginalised 
Hamutenya and other dissidents by excluding them from the government and the party. 
Consequently, Hamutenya and other opponents of Nujoma and Pohamba defected from 
SWAPO and formed a new party, the Rally for Democracy and Progress (RDP), in 
November 2007. On the day Hamutenya left SWAPO, the Political Bureau announced the 
nomination of former Prime Minister Hage Geingob as the sole candidate for the vice 
presidency and Pohamba as party president in the forthcoming meeting of Congress. 
SWAPO also changed its rules such that if a party president does not seek re-election as 
the national president, he or she is succeeded as presidential candidate by the party’s vice 
president (Cooper 2015: 11). In April 2008, Pohamba and Geingob were elected 
unopposed as party president and vice president respectively, and Geingob was appointed 
Minister of Trade and Industry. Geingob had been Prime Minister until 2002 when he was 
appointed as a local government minister by then President Nujoma. Geingob rejected 
the demotion and moved abroad. He returned to Namibia and was elected a Member of 
Parliament in March 2005 (Africa Research Bulletin 2007: 17303; Africa Research 
Bulletin 2012: 19518; Melber, Kromrey and Welz 2017: 295). 
Although President Pohamba was reportedly ill and planned to step down early, 
allowing Geingob to take over as president without facing a direct election (Africa 
Research Bulletin 2007: 17303), he nevertheless served for two terms, being re-elected 
with a 75% majority in November 2009. The defection of Hamutenya and other 
opponents of Nujoma and Pohamba from SWAPO did not have a major impact on 
SWAPO’s electoral dominance, Hamutenya gaining just 11% in the presidential election 
and his party, RDP, 11% in the legislative election in 2009, while Pohamba’s support 
declined by only 1 percentage point from the previous election (International Foundation 
for Electoral Systems n.d.).  
In December 2012, two years before the 2014 presidential election, Geingob was 
re-elected as the party’s vice president and its presidential candidate with 52% of votes 
in Congress and was reappointed Prime Minister. Presidential candidate selection was 
relatively open for the first time in SWAPO’s history (Africa Research Bulletin 2012: 
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19518; Melber 2015: 51–59; Cooper 2015: 11). Pohamba reportedly campaigned for 
Geingob’s re-election as the party’s vice-president in secret, while Nujoma had no 
influence on the selection (The Namibian 24 September 2012, November 2012, 
December 2012; Africa Research Bulletin 2012: 19518).  
In November 2014, Geingob was elected president with an 87% majority 
(International Foundation for Electoral Systems n.d.). As Hamutenya had polled only 3% 
and his party, the RDP, only 4%, he surrendered the party presidency and returned to 
SWAPO in August 2015 (Melber 2015: 56). Thus, the first defection of a presidential 
candidate and other party members from SWAPO was a far from critical defection and 
did not threaten its electoral dominance. 
Without a solid support base in the party as with Pohamba backed by Nujoma, 
Geingob adopted an inclusive approach in running the government by incorporating his 
predecessors, the old guard and his rivals in SWAPO presidential candidate selection 
process (Melber 2015: 60; Melber, Kromrey and Welz 2017: 294–299). This can be seen 
from his formation of a Presidential Council comprising himself, his two predecessors 
(i.e., Nujoma and Pohamba), previous prime ministers and their deputies in February 
2015. Geingob also appointed Nickey Iyambo, the eldest of the first generation of party 
members, as the country’s first vice-president (Melber, Kromrey and Welz 2017: 297). In 
April 2015, Geingob consolidated power by taking over the party presidency from 
Pohamba (The Namibian 20 April 2015; Melber, Kromrey and Welz 2017: 299). 
In summary, SWAPO’s presidential candidate selection has been influenced 
mainly by incumbent presidents; in particular, the first, Nujoma, visibly imposed the 
successor of his choice on the party’s leadership selection. The marginalisation of his 
opponents in the party triggered their defection and the formation of a splinter party. 
While these defections had no significant influence on election results, President Geingob, 
with support from former President Pohamba, has taken measures to accommodate his 
predecessors and rival factions to unite the party. Yet, overall, SWAPO represents another 
case of centralised presidential candidate selection by the incumbent. 
 
3.3. Mozambique: Collective Management of Presidential Candidate Selection and 
Factionalism by the Party Elite 
 
In Mozambique, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation 
Front: FRELIMO) has maintained dominant rule since the first multiparty elections in 
1994, following a peace agreement between President Joachim Chissano and Afonso 
Dhlakama, leader of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambican National 
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Resistance: RENAMO) in 1992. Mozambican presidents are directly elected by citizens 
through the FPTP system, while members of parliament are elected using a closed-list PR 
system (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2008). In contrast to Botswana’s BDP and Namibia’s 
SWAPO, whereby incumbent presidents have been influential in the selection of their 
successors, FRELIMO is characterised by collective management of factionalism and 
leadership succession by the party elite with the strong influence of former freedom 
fighters in Mozambique’s independence struggle (Carbone 2003: 11; Hanlon 2011). 
Founded in 1962 and led by Samora Machel, FRELIMO was central in achieving 
Mozambique’s independence from Portugal in 1975. Having evolved into a Marxist-
Leninist party in 1977, with restricted membership of the working class, urban proletariat 
and bureaucrats, FRELIMO began to incorporate all social classes and dramatically 
increased party membership in the late 1990s (Carbone 2005: 424, 430). Although 
FRELIMO’s administrative division reportedly begins with 30,000 local células (cells), 
as is the case with most communist parties, the party as a whole, including its presidential 
candidate selection process, operates in a top-down fashion (Carbone 2003: 10). 
Since 2002, FRELIMO presidential candidate selection has been organised in 
stages representing the party’s three organs. Firstly, the Political Commission (17 
members) nominates three to five candidates. Secondly, the Central Committee 
(approximately190 members) selects a single candidate through a vote. Finally, a meeting 
of Congress (approximately 2,300 delegates) either approves or disapproves the candidate 
proposed by the Central Committee. In practice, presidential candidates selected by the 
Central Committee in 2002 and 2014 were endorsed by Congress (Carbone 2005: 439; 
Aim News Cast 8 June 2002; Carbone 2003: 11; Think Africa Press 25 October 2012; 
Club of Mozambique 30 September 2017). The Political Commission and Central 
Committee are characterised by the continuing power and privileges of former 
combatants in the anti-colonial struggle, who are viewed as ‘guarantors of the superior 
ethics of the national leadership in the face of the new and allegedly more corruptible 
politicians brought to the fore by multiparty politics’ (Carbone 2003: 11).  
 In October 1986, President Machel died in a plane crash and Foreign Minister 
Joaquim Chissano was unanimously elected as his successor at a meeting of the 
FRELIMO Central Committee (Legum 1988: B681). Following the peace agreement 
signed in 1992, Mozambique held its first multiparty elections in 1994 and Chissano won 
with a 53% majority. Chissano was re-elected by the same margin in 1999 albeit amid 
widespread accusations of corruption (African Election Database n.d.; Carbone 2005; 
Hanlon 2011). As the Constitution had been amended in 1990 to allow the president to 
serve up to three five-year terms, Chissano was eligible for re-election in 2004 and sought 
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to stand for a third term. However, this proposal was reportedly rejected at Congress on 
the grounds that he might well lose the forthcoming election (PanAfrican News Agency 
9 May 2001; Think Africa Press 25 October 2012). 
Chissano’s successor was selected in June 2002, two years before the end of his 
two terms in office, ‘in a largely consensual and disciplined, but explicitly top-down and 
undemocratic, manner’ (Carbone 2005: 43–431). The party’s Central Committee 
upgraded the position of Secretary General to enable him or her to stand for the 2004 
presidential election and instructed the Political Commission, then consisting of 15 party 
members, to select between three and five candidates for the position. After five 
candidates had been selected by the Political Commission, the Central Committee, then 
comprising 156 members, selected a single candidate. Former Interior Minister and 
prosperous businessman Armando Guebuza received 109 (73%) of 150 votes and was 
duly nominated as Secretary General and presidential candidate at the Central Committee 
(Cravinho 2003: 705). While Guebuza had been a member of the senior party leadership 
since 1968 and had served in various cabinet posts during the Machel and Chissano 
administrations (Aim News Cast 8 June 2002), he was not Chissano’s choice. This was 
Agricultural Minister Helder Muteia, who was rumoured to succeed him but polled only 
18 votes. Finally, Guebuza was selected as the new Secretary General and 2004 
presidential candidate by polling 92% of votes in Congress (Cravinho 2003: 705).  
As the newly elected Secretary General, Gueuza toured the country to rebuild 
local party structures that had been neglected by Chissano (Aim News Cast 8 June 2002). 
Chissano compromised and campaigned for Guebuza in the 2004 election (Hanlon 2011; 
Think Africa Press 25 October 2012; Verdade 25 September 2013). Guebuza was 
subsequently elected with a 64% majority (11 percentage points more than Chissano had 
polled when he was elected) and assumed the party presidency from Chissano a month 
later. Guebuza was re-elected with a 75% majority in October 2009 (International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems n.d.; Agência de Informação de Moçambique 12 March 
2015). 
Despite his consolidation of power through national and party elections, 
President Guebuza’s authority was constrained by FRELIMO leaders. For example, the 
appointment of cabinet ministers was negotiated by the Political Commission and his first 
two choices for justice minister were rejected. While the Constitution had been revised in 
2004 to limit presidential incumbency to two five-year terms, he sought to repeal it to 
allow himself a third term. However, FRELIMO rejected the proposal to provide 
opportunities for the younger generation of the party (Think Africa Press 25 October 
2012).  
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Having been re-elected party president unopposed in 2012, Guebuza sought to 
make relatively weak Prime Minister Aires Ali his successor, while maintaining his power 
as party chairman. On the other hand, an anti-Guebuza faction led by Grace Machel, wife 
of the first president, and former President Chissano promoted former Prime Minister 
Luisa Diogo for the presidential candidacy. However, neither Ali nor Diogo was elected 
as a member of the Political Commission at a meeting of the Central Committee in 2012 
(Agência de Informação de Moçambique 27 September 2012; Think Africa Press 25 
October 2012; Reuters 2 March 2014). Thus, factional competition between Guebuza 
loyalists and opponents was mitigated by the party’s Central Committee. In March 2014, 
the FRELIMO’s Central Committee elected Defence Minister Filipe Nyusi, Guebuza’s 
close ally, as the FRELIMO candidate for the presidential election in October. While 
Guebuza loyalists at the Political Commission had selected three pro-Guebuza candidates 
including Nyusi, his opponents forced Diogo and Ali onto the list. At the Central 
Committee meeting, Nyusi gained 91 (46%) of 196 votes, while Diogo received 46 votes 
(24%) and Ali 19 votes (10%). As none of the five candidates won a majority in the first 
round, the voting went to a second round which Nyusi won with 135 votes (68%) (Think 
Africa Press 27 February 2014; Mozambique News Reports and Clippings 1 March 2014).  
While FRELIMO’s 2014 presidential candidate selection represented a 
generational shift in the party as none of the five candidates had fought in the 
independence war, Nyusi had close links with the liberation movement through his 
parents who were FRELIMO war veterans. Nyusi advanced in his political career rapidly. 
Although he served as Defence Minister since 2008, he was not elected to the Central 
Committee until 2012 and was the least well known nationally of the five candidates 
(Agência de Informação de Moçambique 10 March 2014; Club of Mozambique 15 
September 2017). Yet, his roots in the north of the country apparently helped him win 
support within FRELIMO, as the party sought to incorporate the needs of northerners 
after the discovery of huge off-shore natural gas reserves in the region (African Research 
Bulletin 2014: 20062). As Nyusi was close to President Guebuza, the latter was expected 
to maintain power by continuing to hold the party presidency (Reuters 2 March 2014). 
In October 2014, Nyusi won the presidential election with 57% of valid votes. 
Since he had polled only 52% of all cast votes including spoiled ballots, it was argued 
that there would have been a second round if it had not been for electoral fraud on the 
part of FRELIMO (Africa Confidential 7 November 2014). In March 2015, Nyusi 
succeeded Guebuza as party president (Agência de Informação de Moçambique 29 March 
2015). In September 2017, Nyusi was re-elected party president, won the presidential 
candidacy for the 2019 election with a better than 99% majority at the FRELIMO 
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Congress, and gained effective control over the party the following month since no one 
in the Political Commission was linked to Guebuza any longer (Club of Mozambique 30 
September 2017, 2 October 2017). 
From a comparative perspective, FRELIMO is the only one of the five case 
parties discussed in this paper that has never experienced the defection of a senior party 
member. FRELIMO unity, with its tradition of collective and inclusive decision making, 
may be attributed to its origin as a Marxist-Leninist party and the fact that electoral 
margins between FRELIMO and RENAMO were narrow in the early years of 
multipartyism, FRELIMO’s share of the vote being 53% in the presidential elections of 
both 1994 and 1999 (African Election Database n.d.). 
Furthermore, Mozambican electoral competition is influenced by a fragile 
political environment. In 2014, armed conflict between the government and RENAMO 
erupted after the leader of the latter, Afonso Dhlakama, refused to accept the election 
result and threatened to use force to take control of the provinces, which he believed had 
won the majority of votes. Although Nyusi and Dhlakama reached a peace agreement in 
February 2018, Dhlakama died suddenly in May and the prospect of a permanent peace 
accord remains uncertain (Sanches and Macuane 28 May 2018).  
Electoral competition with RENAMO and the fragile political environment may 
have contributed to the strengthening of solidarity amongst FRELIMO leaders; yet, 
FRELIMO unity has recently been challenged by generational division. While the party’s 
old guard has been reluctant to cede power to the younger generation (Hanlon 2011; 
Melber, Kromrey and Welz 2017: 310), Samora Machel Junior, son of the first president, 
has emerged as a potential threat to party unity. In June 2018, his bid for the FRELIMO 
candidacy for Mayor of Maputo was blocked by the Political Commission with the 
support of President Nyusi, and Machel Junior’s subsequent attempt to stand as an 
independent candidate backed by a coalition of civil society organisations was rejected 
by the National Elections Commission and Constitutional Council (Agência de 
Informação de Moçambique 14 August 2018; Hanlon 20 August 2018; Africa 
Confidential 26 October 2018; Club of Mozambique 14 November 2018). This 
development seems to contrast with FRELIMO accommodation of potential young 
opponents in the 1990s. For example, the party co-opted a young trade union leader, 
Soares Nhaca, by appointing him Governor of Maputo in 1999 and Minister of 
Agriculture in 2008 (Hanlon 6 October 2011). 
In summary, FRELIMO presidential candidate selection has been collectively 
managed by the party elite in the Political Commission and Central Committee, which 
has in turn constrained the power of incumbent and former presidents. FRELIMO has 
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remained inclusive and co-opted potential dissidents and there has not been any defection 
of party leaders. Competition with a relatively strong opposition party and the fragile 
political environment may have contributed to enforcing the solidarity of party leaders 
and it is only recently that party unity has begun to be challenged by the emergence of 
generational division. 
 
3.4. Tanzania: the Changing Party Elite Influencing Presidential Candidate 
Selection 
 
Tanzania’s dominant party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party of Revolution: CCM) is 
characterised by growing factionalism and the concerns of different party leaders who 
have exercised power over presidential candidate selection for the last two decades. 
Unlike the other cases, CCM’s presidential candidate selection is an independent process 
that takes place several months before a general election, and separate from the selection 
of party leadership positions. The first presidential succession under the multiparty 
system in 1995 was influenced by the first president, Julius Nyerere. The second 
succession in 2005 was dominated by a powerful clientelist faction, which subsequently 
created a sharp division in the party. The most recent succession in 2015 was characterised 
by collective control by senior party leaders with the strong influence of former presidents, 
particularly Benjamin Mkapa. The CCM’s presidential nomination of 2015 led to the 
defection of the frontrunner, who was eliminated at the first stage of the selection process, 
posing serious challenges to the CCM election campaign. Yet, this defection did not prove 
to be critical as the number of defectors was limited (Tsubura 2018). 
 CCM presidential candidate selection has four stages. Firstly, the National 
Security and Ethics Committee (NSEC) (11 members including the national president 
who doubles as party chairman) evaluates the qualifications of all nominees. Secondly, 
the Central Committee (up to 34 members) takes into account NSEC recommendations 
and selects no more than five candidates. Thirdly, the National Executive Committee 
(NEC) (378 members) selects not more than three candidates.5 Lastly, the final candidate 
is selected by over 2,000 delegates in a poll at the National Congress (Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi 2002, 2012; Nyamajeje 2015: 1; Daily News 24 June 2015; Daily News 11 
July 2015; Daily News 17 September 2015). Thus, CCM presidential nomination is 
partially centralised in that the Central Committee and NEC short-list candidates before 
selection at the National Congress. 
                                                   
5 In March 2017, the CCM constitution was amended, and the number of Central Committee 
members was reduced to 24 and NEC members to 163 (Daily News 13 March 2017). 
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 After Tanzania reintroduced a multiparty system in 1992 under its second 
president, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, CCM presidential candidate selection in 1995 was 
particularly influenced by President Nyerere. He reportedly favoured Minister for Science, 
Technology and Higher Education Benjamin Mkapa of the three candidates selected by 
the NEC and campaigned for him behind the scenes. Although Mkapa had been a cabinet 
minister for two decades, he was not popularly known compared to some other candidates 
(Warrema 2012: 27; Makulio 2013: 178; Mwananchi 14 October 2015). However, he was 
elected as the party’s presidential candidate after two rounds of voting at the National 
Congress and elected as president with a 62% majority in 1995. Mkapa’s closest 
challenger, former Minister for Home Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister Augustine 
Mrema, who had defected from the CCM, polled 28% of valid votes. In 2000, President 
Mkapa was re-elected with a 72% majority, an increase of about 10 percentage points 
from the 1995 election (The Citizen 31 May 2015; Chachage 13 February 2015; African 
Election Database n.d.). 
 Following the 1995 election, a group of CCM leaders began to build a network 
in preparation for the presidential candidacy of Foreign Minister Jakaya Kikwete after 
President Mkapa’s two-terms in office. The network was led by Kikwete’s friend and 
cabinet minister Edward Lowassa. They established close connections with the business 
sector and relied heavily on financial resources to mobilise support from inside and 
outside the party (Makulilo 2013: 68; The Citizen 31 May 2015). Kikwete was elected as 
the CCM presidential candidate with 1,072 (64%) of 1,678 votes at the party’s National 
Congress in May 2005. Subsequently, he was elected president with 80% of the popular 
vote in the general election in December (Kelsall 2007: 525; Africa Election Database 
n.d.). Lowassa led Kikwete’s presidential campaign and was appointed prime minister 
after the election. Outgoing President Mkapa was reportedly not in favour of Kikwete’s 
candidacy but surrendered to his strong network (The East African 22 February 2014). 
Thus, unlike the presidential succession in 1995, which was influenced by former 
President Nyerere, CCM presidential candidate selection in 2005 was characterised by 
the overwhelming power of Kikwete and Lowassa’s faction in the party. 
 CCM and the Kikwete administration were seriously plagued by grand 
corruption scandals, one of which led to the resignation of Prime Minister Lowassa and 
two other ministers due to political prudence (The Citizen 31 October 2007; Sitta, Slaa 
and Cheyo 2008: 82–86; Slaa 2011: 90). CCM leaders were divided on how to address 
corruption, and the public image of the Kikwete government and the party in general 
deteriorated (The Citizen 17 February 2010). Kikwete started to distance himself from 
Lowassa after the resignation of the latter, who began to build his own network of support 
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within the CCM. 6  Although President Kikwete tried to resolve party divisions, 
corruption allegations and lack of party coherence affected the election in 2010 (Legal 
and Human Rights Centre and Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election 
Observation 2010: 55). Kikwete was re-elected with 61% of the popular vote, a 19 
percentage point decline from the 2005 election (African Election Database n.d.). 
President Kikwete subsequently redoubled his efforts to control the influence of 
Lowassa’s faction in an attempt to regain public trust in the CCM, yet he continued to 
struggle to control it until the end of his second two-year term (Tanzania Election 
Monitoring Committee 2015b: 7). 
 In July 2015, the CCM selected Kikwete’s successor. Of the 38 candidates who 
submitted presidential nomination forms, Lowassa seemed to be the strongest contender, 
with his extensive leadership experience, wide financial network, and active campaign 
teams of urban youth (Daily News 3 July 2015; Mwananchi 11 May 2015; Mwananchi 
29 July 2015b). Indeed, Lowassa was chosen as the most popular CCM candidate in an 
opinion poll in June 2015 and almost three-quarters of the NEC membership were 
reportedly Lowassa supporters (Nipashe 6 July 2015; The East African 23 May 2015; 
Mwananchi 11 July 2015). 
 However, Lowassa was not chosen by the CCM Central Committee as one of the 
five presidential candidates in July (The Citizen 11 July 2015). Based on the 
recommendations of the NSEC, which had reviewed all the presidential candidates, five 
other candidates were selected at the meeting of the Central Committee, which was also 
attended by senior party leaders including former presidents Mwinyi and Mkapa 
(Mwananchi 7 July 2015; Nipashe 8 July 2015; Mwananchi 9 July 2015).7 Immediately 
after the committee’s announcement of its five chosen candidates, Lowassa and three 
committee members who were allegedly Lowassa loyalists publicly rejected the decision, 
complaining that the NSEC had pre-selected the candidates before the Central Committee 
meeting (Mwananchi 11 July 2015; The Citizen 12 July 2015; Mwananchi 29 July 2015a; 
Britain-Tanzania Society 2015).  
The final selection by the NEC was intensely competitive, the meeting opening 
with a number of NEC members chanting their support for Lowassa (Simu TV 11 July 
2015). It was reported that senior party leaders had consultations with Lowassa’s camp, 
and the former presidents and a former prime minister advised NEC members to think 
carefully about their decision (The Citizen 12 July 2015; Mwananchi 12 July 2015). Three 
candidates were selected by the NEC, and finally, Minister of Works John Magufuli was 
                                                   
6 Interview, Humphrey Polepole, political analyst, 3 November 2013, Dar es Salaam (the author). 
7 Interview, Humphrey Polepole, political analyst, 3 November 2013, Dar es Salaam (the author). 
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elected as the CCM presidential candidate at a National Congress meeting with the large 
majority of 2,104 (87%) of 2,416 votes (Mwananchi twitter 11 July 2015; Azam TV 
twitter 12 July 2015). 
 While Magufuli had served as a cabinet minister throughout the Mkapa and 
Kikwete administrations, he had not publicly campaigned for the presidency before the 
2015 CCM selection process. Yet, he was considered the perfect candidate to unite the 
party because he distanced himself from party factionalism (Nyamajeje 2015; Mwananchi 
6 November 2015). His nomination was not arbitrary but orchestrated by President 
Kikwete and other senior party leaders (The Citizen 4 November 2015). In particular, 
former President Mkapa was reportedly active in consolidating support for Magufuli’s 
candidacy behind the scenes.8 
 A month later, Lowassa defected to the main opposition party, Chama Cha 
Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Party for Democracy and Progress: CHADEMA), and was 
officially declared the presidential candidate of an opposition coalition, Umoja wa Katiba 
ya Wananchi (Coalition of the People’s Constitution: UKAWA), which included 
CHADEMA. Despite CHADEMA’s expectation that Lowassa would encourage more 
than a million CCM members to join him, other than a few senior party leaders, there was 
a disappointing number of defectors to the opposition (Tanzania Election Monitoring 
Committee 2015a: 33; Mwananchi 10 October 2015). For example, the three Central 
Committee members who had opposed the committee’s decision to eliminate Lowassa 
from presidential nomination remained in the CCM and campaigned for Magufuli 
(Mwananchi 13 July 2015; Daily News 8 August 2015; Habari Leo 10 August 2015; 
Mwananchi 13 August 2015; The Citizen 22 August 2015).  
This lack of support was partly because UKAWA had already selected its 
parliamentary candidates and CCM MPs would not have been able to contest the 
parliamentary election if they had defected to the opposition (Mwananchi 24 August 
2015). Moreover, there was limited time for potential defectors to prepare effective 
campaigns as the general election was scheduled only a few months after CCM 
presidential candidate selection. However, some CCM members who had remained in the 
party secretly supported Lowassa and challenged Magufuli’s election campaign (The 
Citizen 6 November 2015). As a result, in the presidential election in October 2015, 
Magufuli won with a meagre 59% majority, the lowest support rate of any CCM 
presidential candidate since the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1992 
(International Foundation for Electoral Systems). Lowassa left CHADEMA and returned 
to CCM in March 2019 (Mwananchi 2 March 2019). 
                                                   
8 Interview, political scientist, 13 November 2013, Dar es Salaam (the author). 
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 In summary, the case of Tanzania’s CCM illustrates growing factionalism and 
the changing party elite who have had significant influence on the presidential candidate 
selection. Thus, while the 1995 selection process was led by former President Nyerere, in 
2005, it was influenced by Kikwete and Lowassa’s faction. The CCM 2015 presidential 
nomination represents a revival of centralised control of selection, with the strong 
influence of former President Mkapa. This led to the defection of the frontrunner in the 
presidential race as he had been eliminated from the selection process by senior party 
leaders. Yet, this did not transpire to be critical for the CCM as the number of defectors 
was limited, partly due to lack of time to prepare election campaigns on the part of the 
opposition. 
 
3.5. South Africa: A Shift to Decentralised and Competitive Presidential Candidate 
Selection 
 
Leadership succession battles have been increasingly fraught for the African National 
Congress (ANC) in South Africa over the years. Whereas Thabo Mbeki succeeded 
President Nelson Mandela without difficulty in 1999, Jacob Zuma’s accession to the 
presidency in 2007 was accompanied by the early resignation of Mbeki and the 
subsequent marginalisation of his loyalists, which resulted in the first major ANC 
defection and the formation of a breakaway party. Zuma’s succession in 2017 was also 
highly competitive and current President Cyril Ramaphosa faces challenges in uniting the 
party in preparation for the 2019 elections. However, the significant influence of factional 
division on party operations notwithstanding, the ANC has maintained its decentralised 
and competitive methods of presidential candidate selection since 2007 to stay true to its 
origins as a mass party. 
In 1912, the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was founded by 
various organisations representing indigenous Africans and the professional elite to 
consolidate the struggle of oppressed South Africans for freedom and civil rights. The 
SANNC changed its name to the ANC in 1923 and grew into a mass movement that 
organised public pressure against the white government’s discrimination against blacks 
(Reddy 2014: 77; Salih 2003: 16). The ANC was central in the abolition of apartheid in 
1994 and has won all national elections since the first democratic election that year by a 
margin of not less than 62 percent, while the opposition has remained fragmented (De 
Jager 2013; International Foundation for Electoral Systems n.d.). 
The ANC is structured according to conferences, meetings and committees at 
national, provincial, regional and branch levels. The supreme body of the party is the 
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National Conference with over 5,000 voting delegates, 90% of whom represent over 
4,700 branches across the country, each consisting of 100 party members, and the 
remainder representing the other three party wings. The NEC is the highest organ of the 
party, consisting of six leadership positions (president, deputy president, secretary general, 
deputy secretary general, national chairperson, and treasurer general) and 80 members 
elected by secret ballot at the National Conference every five years. Candidates for each 
leadership position are nominated by party branches, and delegates at the National 
Conference expressly reflect the wishes of their branches in voting (African National 
Congress 2017; Times Live 11 December 2017; The South African 17 December 2017; 
Eyewitness News 14 December 2017). Since it is customary that the party’s president 
automatically becomes the national president if the ANC wins a legislative election 
(Walentek 2015: 93), there is no stage at which presidential candidates are shortlisted by 
higher organs of the party. The selectorate of presidential candidate selection is thus the 
most inclusive of the five dominant parties examined in this paper. 
In practice, when the ANC was banned during the apartheid era between 1960 
and 1990, its leadership selection was controlled and facilitated by party leaders who 
agreed on a single candidacy, a practice that continued for a decade after the end of 
apartheid. The top six positions were selected collectively by party executives, the 
National Conference only approving each pre-determined leader, and until 2007, many of 
the six positions were selected uncontested (Booysen 2011: 39). This illustrates ANC 
discipline and solidarity and its preference for the appointment of successors rather than 
open competition (Lodge 2004: 211; Handley, Murray and Simeon 2008: 198-199).  
 Mandela became ANC president in 1991 and national president after the 
country’s first democratic election in 1994, in which ANC won a 63% majority and 252 
of 400 parliamentary seats (African Election Database n.d.). As Mandela had announced 
his intention to retire from office after one term, ANC Secretary General Cyril Ramaphosa 
and National Chairperson Thabo Mbeki were both rumoured to be a potential successor. 
Although Ramaphosa was close to Mandela, Mbeki enjoyed greater support from senior 
figures who had managed the party from its headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia during the 
apartheid era. Ramaphosa chose to leave politics rather than contesting the ANC 
presidency and Mbeki was elected party president at the National Conference in 
December 1997 (Walentek 2015: 94; Cooper 2015: 7–9). In the 1999 election, the ANC 
won a 66% majority securing 266 of 400 parliamentary seats, and Mbeki took presidential 
office. In the 2004 election, the ANC slightly increased its parliamentary majority by 
polling 67% of valid votes and obtaining 279 of 400 seats, and Mbeki was re-elected for 
a second-term (African Election Database n.d.; International Foundation for Electoral 
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Systems n.d.).  
ANC practice of facilitated leadership selection dramatically changed in June 
2005 when President Mbeki dismissed once loyal ally Deputy President Jacob Zuma over 
corruption allegations (Wieczorek 2012: 31). At the same time, Mbeki’s leadership style 
was losing touch with ordinary citizens and his market-oriented economic policy was 
increasingly disapproved of the public. Zuma, on the other hand, was popular among 
ANC members, particularly by the youth wing and the ANC’s partners (i.e., the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions, the South African Communist Party) because of his 
closeness to the people and political credentials including ten years in prison on Robben 
Island. As a result, there was intense competition between Mbeki and Zuma loyalists, 
leading to a move away from the party norm which meant that ‘the ANC should deal with 
internal disputes privately and thus always present a unified public face’ (Handley, 
Murray and Simeon 2008: 199). As a result, Zuma loyalists succeeded in forcing Mbeki 
and the ANC leadership to reinstate Zuma as party deputy president, but Mbeki refused 
to reappoint him as the country’s deputy president (Myburgh and Giliomee 2010: 193; 
Wieczorek 2012: 31). 
At the ANC National Conference in Polokwane, Limpopo Province in December 
2007, Zuma and Mbeki loyalists openly competed for leadership positions for the first 
time since the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. Although Mbeki could not stand for the 
2009 election due to the presidential term limit, he sought re-election as party president 
for another five years to retain some power. Yet, Zuma won the party presidency with 
2,329 (58%) of 3,974 votes, while Mbeki only gained 1,505 votes (38%) (Booysen 2011: 
67). Furthermore, Zuma loyalists obtained all five remaining leadership positions, thus 
dominating the newly elected NEC, Mbeki’s power over the Cabinet and incumbent NEC 
notwithstanding. Mbeki’s defeat was due in part to his detachment from the local party 
structure: while Zuma successfully mobilised support in his strongholds, Mbeki had 
neglected some powerful provincial leaders, ultimately losing their support at Polokwane 
(Darracq 2008a: 449; Mac Giollabhui 2017: 394–410). Thus, Zuma’s reinstatement as 
ANC deputy president and his victory at Polokwane illustrates the strength of the ANC 
rank and file in leadership selection (Darracq 2008a: 440, 448–449). 
Zuma’s victory at Polokwane resulted in intense factional competition within the 
party (Booysen 2011). President Mbeki and cabinet ministers loyal to him allegedly used 
their influence over the prosecuting authority to ensure that Zuma would be found guilty 
on the corruption charge, while Zuma’s allies sought to marginalise Mbeki’s faction in 
relation to ANC administrative staff, the parliamentary caucus and provincial 
governments (Cooper 2015: 9). As a result, in September 2008, Mbeki was declared unfit 
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to be president by the NEC, he resigned six months before the end of his term, and eleven 
ministers and three deputy ministers loyal to Mbeki resigned a week later. ANC Deputy 
President Kgalema Motlanthe was elected as caretaker president of the country and five 
cabinet members who had resigned were reappointed (Booysen 2011: 68–69; Wieczorek 
2012: 31). In the election in April 2009, the ANC won 66% of the popular vote, gained 
264 of 400 parliamentary seats, and, having had his trial dismissed, Zuma was elected the 
new president (International Foundation for Electoral Systems n.d.). 
In December 2008, a group of ANC members sympathetic to Mbeki and 
dissatisfied with Zuma’s rise to power had defected from the party and formed the 
country’s first black opposition party, the Congress of the People (COPE), drawing wide 
public attention (Booysen 2011: 69–70; Walentek 2015: 98–99). Yet, COPE did not have 
a major impact on the election in 2009, polling only 7% of valid votes and being allocated 
30 parliamentary seats. In the 2014 election, when the ANC won a 62% majority and 
Zuma was re-elected for a second term, support for COPE declined to 1% and 3 
parliamentary seats (International Foundation for Electoral Systems n.d.). Thus, although 
the defection of Zuma’s opponents and the formation of COPE was a major event in ANC 
history, it did not threaten its electoral dominance. 
Despite the high public expectations of Zuma at the beginning of his 
administration, his presidency was characterised by serious corruption charges including 
misuse of public funds for his private residence, the loss of powerful party members, and 
collapse of the partnership with the trade unions and the communist party (Booysen 2015: 
47-51, 296–297; Booysen 15 December 2017). 
In December 2017, Cyril Ramaphosa won the party presidency with 179 of 4,708 
votes at the ANC National Conference, the slimmest margin in any leadership selection 
undertaken by the party. Unlike Zuma’s victory at Polokwane in 2008, the six leadership 
positions were equally divided among allies of reformist Ramaphosa and populist Zuma, 
while the majority of newly elected NEC members were reportedly Zuma loyalists. 
Subsequently, Zuma resigned under ANC pressure mainly due to corruption allegations, 
and Ramaphosa succeeded the presidency in February. He will be the ANC presidential 
candidate for the legislative election scheduled for May 2019 (Schneidman 2017; The 
Guardian 14 February 2018; Reuters 7 November 2018). Given that Ramaphosa lacks 
control over the party’s national executive and four out of the nine provinces where Zuma 
support remains strong, he is struggling to unite the ANC in preparation for the 
forthcoming election (Africa Confidential 4 May 2018; Southall 28 October 2018). In an 
attempt to rise to the challenge, Ramaphosa has sought to accommodate his rivals by, for 
example, appointing Zuma’s ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma Minister in the 
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Presidency for the National Planning Commission for Monitoring and Evaluation (The 
Independent 26 February 2018). 
Despite the intense factional infighting since 2007, the ANC has maintained its 
methods of decentralised and competitive leadership selection, unlike other parties 
examined in this paper. While the ANC seems to be finding it difficult to control 
factionalism and regain party coherence after intense competition over leadership 
positions, its leadership selection method is associated with its historical development as 
a mass party with well-organised local branches and an active party membership (Darracq 
2008a, 2008b; Lodge 2004). Darracq (2008a: 439) argues that ‘membership, through the 
delegatory democratic practices of the National Conference, has the power to decide 
between competing agendas promoted by different leadership factions.’ Consequently, 
branches have over the years become increasingly influential in intraparty competition 
for party posts and policy direction. ANC provincial offices function as mediators 
between national leaders and local branches, and factional competition at the national 
level interacts with provincial factionalism (Darracq 2008a: 440–441).  
Mac Giollabhui (2017) further analyses ANC leadership selection methods and 
Zuma’s victory at the ANC 2007 National Conference. Following the assumption of 
power in 1994, the ANC leaders sought to modernise party organisation through the 
centralisation of power over policymaking and appointments in the hands of President 
Mbeki and disengaging party activists. Yet, reform has failed to fully centralise power 
over leadership selection due to endogenous pressure to maintain the ANC as a congress-
like party and accommodate diverse societal interests. Mbeki’s opponents took advantage 
of this and widely mobilised public support for Zuma through the effective use of a 
clientelist strategy which proved successful in removing Mbeki from office in 2007 (Mac 
Giollabhui 2017). Thus, the strategy of decentralised presidential candidate selection has 
been a central ANC approach in establishing its support base. 
From a comparative perspective, ANC employment of decentralised leadership 
selection despite intense factional competition may well be related to South Africa’s 
closed-list PR electoral system, through which citizens do not vote for candidates but for 
parties in a legislative election and presidents are elected in Parliament. Such an electoral 
system allows the ANC to demonstrate intraparty democracy by engaging party members 
in leadership selection through party delegates. Mbeki’s loss of support within the ANC 
due in the main to his negligence of local party members also suggests that decentralised 
leadership selection contributes to the ANC’s enhancement of electoral legitimacy. 
In summary, the ANC has been increasingly afflicted by factional competition 
which leads to shake-ups in its leadership, while it has maintained a method of 
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decentralised and competitive selection since 2007. Although the defection of Mbeki 
loyalists and the formation of an opposition party in 2008 represented the first major split 
in the ANC, the impact on electoral competition was limited. The ANC’s decentralised 
method of selecting party leaders, including presidential candidates, is attributed to its 
historical development as a mass party and its appeal to party members under the closed-
list PR electoral system. 
 
4. Analysis 
 
Through an inductive analysis of the five case parties with the broad application of 
Clientele Migration Theory as a premise, two characteristics seem to have emerged as 
important factors in explaining how these parties have avoided critical defections and 
major party splits: 1) level of selectorate inclusiveness and 2) effective deployment of 
electoral institutions. Firstly, most presidential candidates examined in this paper were 
selected in a relatively centralised way, meaning that party leaders could control 
factionalism in seeking to avoid critical defections. Yet, despite this general tendency, 
there is a wide variation in level of selectorate inclusiveness among the five parties, which 
suggests that there are multiple ways in which dominant parties seek to maintain party 
unity. The cases can be broadly grouped according to three patterns.  
The first includes cases in which incumbent or former presidents play a decisive 
role in selecting forthcoming presidential candidates for their parties. An extreme 
example of such a case is Botswana’s BDP, in which, in the interest of avoiding intraparty 
splits, incumbent presidents have been exclusively responsible for selecting their 
successors since 1997, and presidential successions have thus run smoothly. The 
presidential candidate selection of Namibia’s SWAPO since 2002 and Tanzania’s CCM 
in 1995 and 2005 also represent this pattern in varying degrees. In these cases, outgoing 
presidents Nujoma and Pohamba as well as former presidents Nyerere and Mkapa 
exercised their power to select forthcoming presidential candidates to maintain their own 
power and/or party coherence behind the scenes. The second pattern is characterised by 
collective control of presidential candidate selection and factionalism on the part of the 
party elite, particularly under the strong influence of former freedom fighters, a situation 
which has constrained presidential power. Mozambique’s FRELIMO consistently 
illustrates this pattern. Other examples are South Africa’s ANC until 2007 and, to a certain 
extent, the CCM 2005 succession. The third pattern is the decentralised and competitive 
presidential candidate selection exemplified by the ANC since 2007, whereby candidates 
have been selected by thousands of party delegates, invariably resulting in the defeat of 
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the outgoing president in the ensuing succession struggle.  
The first two patterns exhibit various types of centralised selection process which 
seem to be effective in controlling internal splits and avoiding critical defections in a top-
down manner. By contrast, ANC’s decentralised and open competition since 2007 seems 
to intensify factional division and be unsuitable for consolidating party unity. Yet, the 
ANC has maintained it by adhering to its origin as a mass party and prioritising intraparty 
democracy to maintain wide electoral support. 
Secondly, variation in the methods and practices of presidential candidate 
selection seems to be associated with two types of institution: electoral system and 
election cycle. In South Africa, where presidents are elected at the National Assembly 
after legislative elections under a closed-list PR system, ANC’s decentralised presidential 
candidate selection process provides an opportunity for party members to express their 
views on leadership selection through local party delegates. The election cycle also affects 
the way in which factionalism is managed by a dominant party. In the case of Tanzania’s 
CCM, where presidential candidate selection takes place only a few months before a 
general election, senior party leaders can take the risk of eliminating a powerful but 
divisive contender in the presidential race because party defectors will not have enough 
time to prepare effective election campaigns and the probability of critical defections is 
thus relatively low. These examples suggest that the differing presidential candidate 
selection practices of the cases are partially explained by varying institutional 
arrangements. 
Conversely, a common tendency among the cases is the influence of major but 
not critical defections whereby rival factions seem to contribute to the strengthening of 
dominant party coherence. In all cases except Mozambique, the marginalisation of rival 
factions by incumbent presidents has triggered the defection of factional leaders and/or 
their loyalists (i.e., Khama’s marginalisation of the Kwelagobe and Kedikilwe faction, 
Nujoma and Pohamba’s side-lining of the Hamutenya faction, Zuma’s marginalisation of 
the Mbeki faction, and Kikwete and Mkapa’s exclusion of Lowassa). Three of these 
defections resulted in the formation of a breakaway party (i.e., BMD in Botswana, RDP 
in Namibia, and COPE in South Africa).  
However, none of these defections posed a serious threat to the dominant party 
in the subsequent election. Rather, the presidents of all three countries took measures to 
accommodate opposing factions (i.e. Khama’s temporary appointment of Kedikilwe as 
vice president, Geingob’s accommodation of his rivals in running the government, and 
Ramaphosa’s appointment of Dlamini-Zuma as a cabinet minister). In all cases, 
defections may have served as a lesson for the incumbent president, who then prioritised 
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party coherence through the accommodation of rival factions to mitigate factional 
tensions. Even in Mozambique, where such defections have not troubled the ruling party, 
uncertainty created by intense competition with the opposition and the fragile political 
environment may have had a similar effect to those of the breakaway groups that have 
made the accommodation of dissidents a high priority for the party elite. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In applying Clientele Migration Theory as a premise, this paper has examined the ways 
in which five African dominant parties with regular presidential succession have selected 
their presidential candidates and managed factionalism to avoid critical defections. It has 
demonstrated that presidential candidate selection is centrally controlled by either former 
or incumbent presidents or by the party elite in all cases except that of South Africa’s 
ANC since 2007. The paper highlights the wide variation in methods of presidential 
candidate selection, particularly in terms of selectorate inclusiveness, which suggests that 
there are multiple ways in which parties can avoid critical defections and maintain long-
term electoral dominance. In all the cases, methods and practices of presidential candidate 
selection are influenced by institutional arrangements and underpinned by the ways in 
which parties have established support bases both internally and externally over the years.  
The next step in this research is to further examine variations in levels of 
selectorate inclusiveness and types of electoral institution. To explore reasons for 
differences in the selectorate, the study proposes to analyse party organisation, 
particularly in terms of sources of legitimacy, of the five parties. While party leaders are 
motivated to centrally control presidential candidate selection to manage factionalism, 
the rank and file are expected to prefer decentralised selection methods so that they can 
participate in decision making. Variations in the level of selectorate inclusiveness signify 
the extent to which these two competing demands are balanced and resolved by parties 
on the basis of sources of legitimacy. Here, it is important to investigate changes in this 
balance in the case of South Africa’s ANC in 2007. To shed further light on types of 
electoral institution, historical background will be analysed with the aim of ascertaining 
why certain rules and institutions have been adopted in particular countries. 
The research can also be expanded to explore factors beyond the scope of 
Clientele Migration Theory. While the theory emphasises the benefits for dissidents of 
remaining in a dominant party, there also expected to be various costs to leaving the party 
(e.g., loss of access to resources, government oppression). The study therefore proposes 
to widen its scope by incorporating the analysis of such costs. Furthermore, while this 
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paper analyses presidential candidate selection in dominant parties with the assumption 
that factional competition will naturally arise and defections are likely to occur as a result, 
it is also worth examining mechanisms for avoiding critical defections which may be 
implemented outside the presidential candidate selection process. 
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